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1. Introduction 
In a study of the effect of migration into a country on the life satisfaction of the native 
population, Akay et al. (2014) present an array of findings. These findings will be 
summarized shortly. Akay et al. search for an explanation for the patterns observed. They 
dismiss several possible explanations, and suggest ad hoc ones for their reported findings. 
However, there is no unifying theory on offer, nor an overall model that can yield all the 
findings they report on assimilation-intensity and well-being. The usefulness of a 
unifying theory is obvious: it can generate an array of testable predictions and facilitate 
an orderly and logical interpretation of the findings obtained. A solid theory can also 
provide a clear guide as to what to look for in harvesting and employing the data. And it 
can pinpoint where gaps still exist in relating the data to the theory. It is the purpose of 
this paper to present a theory that systematically and causally links variation in the 
assimilation of migrants with impact on the well-being of native inhabitants. 
The impact of migration on the well-being of the native inhabitants is one of the 
most intensively studied topics in migration research. A typical approach has been to 
estimate the elasticity of earnings and / or of the employment rate of the native 
inhabitants (or of subgroups of the native inhabitants) with respect to migration. A less 
common approach relates the gain to the native inhabitants to the tax proceeds collected 
from the migrants. An intermediate variable here is the host country’s specific human 
capital that the migrants choose to acquire. The idea (cf. Stark, 2010) is that the greater 
this capital, the greater the migrants’ productivity, the higher their earnings, the higher 
the income tax collected from them and, consequently, the greater the gain to the native 
inhabitants. The received literature then assesses the repercussions of migration for the 
well-being of the native inhabitants via moves occurring in the economic space, which is 
perfectly reasonable, though this is not the only space that matters. In this paper we build 
on the idea that the assimilation of migrants impinges on the well-being of the native 
inhabitants, but we take a different course. In the spirit of Akay et al. (2014), we look at 
how the well-being of the native inhabitants is impacted by moves made by the migrants 
in social space. The move places the migrants in the reference group of the natives. The 
“length” of the move (the intensity of assimilation) determines the migrants’ income. 
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We characterize a group of individuals (a population) by the multiset of the 
incomes of the members of the group, X. We employ the following operations and 
definitions. First, by a sum over a multiset we mean a sum over its elements with 
repetitions accounted for. As an example, for {1,1,2,2}X   we have that 
1 1 2 2
x X
x

    . Second, by disjoint groups X and Y we mean that the sets of the 
individuals whose incomes constitute the multisets X and Y are disjoint. For example, 
having disjoint groups of migrants and of native inhabitants means that there is no 
individual who is both a migrant and a native inhabitant (although the sets of the incomes 
of the migrants and of the native inhabitants need not be disjoint). Third, for disjoint 
groups X and Y we define the combined group X Y  as the multiset sum of X and Y.1 
For example, for {1,1, 2}X   and {1, 2,3}Y   we will have a combined group 
{1,1,1,2,2,3}X Y  .2  
For a reference group characterized by a multiset of incomes of its members, X, 
we define the relative deprivation of an individual whose income is y as 
    1| max ,0
| | x X
RD y X x y
X 
  , 
where | |X  is the size of reference group X (the number of members who constitute 
reference group X).3 From this definition it follows that the individual whose relative 
deprivation we measure need not be a member of the group with respect to which the 
individual’s relative deprivation is calculated. For example, we may compute the relative 
deprivation of a native inhabitant, henceforth a native, with respect to a reference group 
of migrants. The aggregate relative deprivation of a group characterized by a multiset of 
incomes Y, with respect to a reference group characterized by a multiset of incomes X, is 
the sum of the levels of relative deprivation of the individuals in Y, calculated with 
respect to the individuals in X:  
                                                 
1 To simplify notation, we use   rather than the often used â  as our symbol of a multiset sum. 
2 Because a constellation that combines groups that are not disjoint is not considered in the analysis that 
follows, we use a notation that does not incorporate such a constellation either.  
3 Because we represent a reference group by the multiset of the incomes of its members, X, we refer to the 
multiset X also as a reference group. 
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   1( | ) | max ,0
| |Yy y xY X
ARD Y X RD y X x y
X  
    . 
Let the well-being of an individual depend positively on the individual’s income, 
and negatively on the individual’s relative deprivation, which arises from comparing his 
income with the incomes of others in his reference group(s); income is desirable, relative 
deprivation is undesirable. A brief foray into the subject of relative deprivation and a 
discussion of the significance of relative comparisons to well-being are in Sorger and 
Stark (2013). To enable us to draw inference from the aggregate relative deprivation of 
the native inhabitants to their well-being, we take the utility functions of the native 
inhabitants to be linear in relative deprivation with the same linear coefficient across all 
the native inhabitants. That is, the utility function of a native inhabitant who compares his 
income y  with reference group X takes the form ( | ) ( ) ( | )u y X f y aRD y X  , where 
0a   and ( )f  is a strictly increasing function.4 We measure the well-being of the group 
of natives, N, whose members compare their incomes with the members of reference 
group X, as sum of the utility levels of the members of N:  
 ( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )
N N N Ny y y y
W N X u y X f y a RD y X f y aARD N X
   
        .  
Holding constant the incomes of the natives, we can gauge the change in the well-
being of the natives, brought about by assimilation of the migrants (which is tantamount 
to adding the migrants to the reference group of the natives), by the change in the 
aggregate relative deprivation of the natives. The magnitude of such a change is 
determined by the intensity of assimilation of the migrants. Different intensities affect the 
extent to which the migrants are added to the reference group of the native inhabitants, as 
well as the different positioning of the assimilating migrants in the native inhabitants’ 
reference group.  
With this measure of well-being in hand, we schematically present a series of 
constellations.  
 
                                                 
4 All the results reported below will go through if the function describing the preferences towards absolute 
income, ( )f  , were to vary among the natives.  
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Constellation I: No assimilation 
In Constellation I, the migrants, whose incomes are 1 each, constitute their own 
reference group, as do the natives whose incomes are 3 and 5. There is no assimilation. 
The migrants do not affect the relative deprivation nor the well-being of the natives.  
 
 
Constellation II: Intermediate assimilation 
In Constellation II, the migrants assimilate, thereby moving, so to speak, into the 
social space of the natives; the migrants are now included in the reference group of the 
natives. Because the intensity of assimilation is moderate, the migrants’ incomes remain 
lower than the incomes of the natives. This assimilation lowers the relative deprivation of 
native “3” and does not affect (leaves at zero) the relative deprivation of native “5.” Thus, 
the aggregate relative deprivation of the natives is lowered and their well-being rises. 
 
 
Constellation III: Complete assimilation 
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In Constellation III, the migrants assimilate perfectly or “completely,” replicating 
the incomes of the natives. This assimilation leaves the aggregate relative deprivation and 
well-being of the natives intact. 
In sum: when the migrants’ level of assimilation is intermediate (Constellation II), 
the natives’ well-being is affected positively; when the migrants do not assimilate 
(Constellation I), the effect on the well-being of the natives is “zero;” and when the 
migrants assimilate completely (Constellation III), the effect on the natives’ well-being is 
“zero” too. These are exactly the results obtained by Akay et al. In their words: “We find 
that the positive effect of immigration on natives’ life satisfaction is a function of the 
assimilation of immigrants in the region. Immigration’s well-being effect is higher in 
regions with intermediate assimilation levels and is essentially zero in regions with no or 
complete assimilation” (p. 72). 
Our proposed theory yields an additional prediction, not tested by Akay et al.: 
when the assimilation level of the migrants is as per constellation IV, the natives’ well-
being is lowered: 
 
 
Constellation IV: Intensive assimilation 
In Constellation IV, the migrants assimilate more intensively than in Constellation 
II. An assimilation of such an extent increases the relative deprivation of “3” and leaves 
unchanged the relative deprivation of “5.” The aggregate relative deprivation of the 
natives increases and their well-being takes a beating. 
We next generalize the preceding examples of migrants’ assimilation and its 
impact on the well-being of the natives. To this end, we specify a condition under which 
assimilation is detrimental or beneficial to the well-being of the natives: for assimilation 
to favor the well-being of the natives, the relative deprivation experienced by the natives 
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from comparison with the assimilating migrants has to be lower than the relative 
deprivation experienced by the natives from a comparison with fellow natives.  
 
2. A general framework 
To begin with, we state and prove a lemma that will enable us to calculate the aggregate 
relative deprivation of a group of individuals with respect to a combined reference group. 
Lemma 1. For disjoint groups X and Y, the aggregate relative deprivation of group Z 
calculated with respect to the combined reference group X Y  is  
 | | | |( | ) ( | ) ( | ).
| | | |
X YARD Z X Y ARD Z X ARD Z Y
X Y X Y
     (1) 
Proof. For any individual z Z  we have that 
 
 
   
   
1( | ) max ,0
| |
1 max ,0 max ,0
| |
| | 1 | | 1max ,0 max ,0
| | | | | | | |
| | | |( | ) ( | ).
| | | |
x X Y
x X Yy
yx X Y
RD z X Y x z
X Y
x z y z
X Y
X Yx z y z
X Y X X Y Y
X YRD z X RD z Y
X Y X Y
 
 
 
 

 

 
      
   
 

 
 
 
Summing up over all z Z  yields (1). □ 
Example 1. Let {1,3}X Z  , {5}Y  . Then 
1( | ) ({1,3} |{1,3}) (3 1) 1,
|{1,3}|
1( | ) ({1,3}|{5}) [(5 1) (5 3)] 6,
|{5}|
ARD Z X ARD
ARD Z Y ARD
   
     
 
and  
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1( | ) ({1,3} |{1,3,5}) [(5 1) (5 3) (3 1)]
|{1,3,5} |
1 1(3 1) [(5 1) (3 1)]
|{1,3,5} | |{1,3,5} |
|{1,3} | 1 |{5} | 1(3 1) [(5 1) (3 1)]
|{1,3,5} | |{1,3} | |{1,3,5} | |{5} |
|{1,3} | |{5({1,3} |{1,3})
|{1,3,5} |
       
     
     
 
ARD Z X Y ARD
ARD }| ({1,3} |{5})
|{1,3,5} |
| | | |( | ) ( | ).
| | | |
  
ARD
X YARD Z X ARD Z Y
X Y X Y
 
Remark 1. Unlike the ARD calculated with respect to a combined reference group (cf. 
Lemma 1), the ARD of a combined population, say combined population X Y , where X 
and Y are disjoint populations, calculated with respect to reference group Z, is a simple 
sum of the levels of the ARD of populations X and Y calculated with respect to Z, namely 
 ( | ) ( | ) ( | ).ARD X Y Z ARD X Z ARD Y Z   
Example 2. Let {1}, {3}, {5}X Y Z   . Then 
1( | ) ({1,3}|{5}) [(5 1) (5 3)] 6
|{5}|
1 1(5 1) (5 3) ({1} |{5}) ({3} |{5})
|{5}| |{5}|
( | ) ( | ).
ARD X Y Z ARD
ARD ARD
ARD X Z ARD Y Z
     
     
 

 
To track the effect of the assimilation of migrants on the well-being of the natives, 
we define a group (population) N  of natives, and a group (population) M  of migrants, 
where | | 0N   and | | 0M   denote the size of groups N and M, respectively. The fact that 
N and M are disjoint groups implies that  
 | | | | | | .N M N M    (2) 
We measure the change in the aggregate relative deprivation of the population of the 
natives caused by the assimilation of the migrants; the very act of assimilation implies 
that the assimilating migrants are included in the reference group of the natives. 
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Claim 1. The aggregate relative deprivation of the natives increases in the wake of 
assimilation of the migrants if and only if the aggregate relative deprivation of the natives 
calculated with respect to the reference group of the migrants is higher than the aggregate 
relative deprivation of the natives calculated with respect to fellow natives as a reference 
group, namely, iff 
 ( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | )ARD N N M ARD N N ARD N M ARD N N   . 
Conversely, the aggregate relative deprivation of the natives decreases in the wake of 
assimilation of the migrants, namely ( | ) ( | )ARD N N M ARD N N , iff 
( | ) ( | )ARD N M ARD N N . 
Proof. Using Lemma 1 and equation (2), we have that 
 
( | ) ( | )
| | | |( | ) ( | ) ( | )
| | | |
| | | | | |( | ) ( | ) ( | )
| | | | | |
| | | | | | | |( | ) ( | ) ( | )
| | | |( | )
| | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
ARD N N M ARD N N
N MARD N N ARD N M ARD N N
N M N M
M N M NARD N M ARD N N ARD N N
N M N M N M
M N M NARD N M ARD N N ARD N N
N M N M
M MARD N M
M
M
N
N

 

  


  
  


 

  
( | )
| | |
( | ) ( | ).
ARD N N
N M
ARD N M ARD N N

 
 
The proof for the case in which the ARD of the natives decreases is analogous. □ 
Claim 1 nicely aligns with intuition. In the case of intensive assimilation, the 
well-being of the natives will not be lowered when ( | ) ( | )ARD N N ARD N M , namely, 
when the aggregate relative deprivation of the natives is relatively high in comparison 
with the aggregate relative deprivation of the natives calculated with respect to the 
migrants. Such a configuration can arise when there is a relatively large dispersion of the 
incomes of the natives. Under intensive assimilation (which, however, income-wise does 
not place the migrants above all the natives), the relative deprivation experienced by the 
“wealthiest” natives is not affected. Changes in the well-being of the natives arise from 
changes in the relative deprivation of the poorer section of the native population. When 
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the incomes of the assimilating migrants are relatively “close” to the incomes of the 
“poor” natives (namely, when the incomes of the assimilating migrants do not exceed the 
incomes of the poor natives by much), the “poor” natives can become less relatively 
deprived as their reference group expands with not-too-wealthy individuals, and the 
overall dispersion in incomes that they experience will then be reduced. Therefore, the 
well-being of the natives can increase even if the assimilation of the migrants is intensive 
and their incomes exceed the incomes of some natives.  
We now show how Claim 1 can be applied to assess the repercussions of the four 
constellations of the assimilation of migrants presented in the Introduction. 
2.1 Constellation I: No assimilation 
With no assimilation, the migrants do not affect the relative deprivation of the natives; 
the migrants are outside the reference group of the natives and, thus, the aggregate 
relative deprivation among the natives, which is  
 1( | ) max{ ,0}
| | z N y N
ARD N N y z
N  
  , 
does not change in the presence of the migrants. The migrants do not affect the well-
being of the natives. 
2.2 Constellation II: Intermediate assimilation 
We assume that the incomes of the assimilating migrants are lower than or equal to the 
incomes of the natives: x y  for any x M , y N . Including the migrants in the 
reference group of the natives, we compute the aggregate relative deprivation of the 
natives, N, with respect to the combined reference group of the migrants and the natives, 
N M . Drawing on the fact that from the assumption x y  for any x M , y N  it 
follows that max{ ,0} 0x y  , we have that ( | ) 0RD y M   for all y N  and, thus, 
 ) ) 0( || (ARD NAR N N MD    
with the inequality being strict if the incomes of the natives are not all the same, in which 
case ( | ) 0ARD N N  . Thus, using Claim 1, we have that  
 ( | ) ( | ).ARD N N M ARD N N   
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An alternative way of obtaining this result is to draw on Lemma 1 and equation (2). 
Indeed, 
| | | |( | ) ( | ) ( | )
| | | |
| | | |( | ) ( | ) ( | ).
| | | | | |
N MARD N N M ARD N N ARD N M
N M N M
N NARD N N ARD N N ARD N N
N M N M
  

 
  
 
Consequently, with an intermediate assimilation of the migrants, the aggregate relative 
deprivation of the natives decreases and their well-being rises (or it stays the same if to 
begin with their ARD was zero). 
Remark 2. It is also of interest to note that the positive impact of assimilation on the 
well-being of the natives (arising from a decrease in the natives’ ARD) is higher, the 
bigger the difference: 
 ( | ) ( | | | ( | ))
| | | |
ARD N N ARD N N M MARD ARD N N
N M
     . 
Treating ARD  as a function of the size of the migrant population | |M , it follows that 
  2
|
| |
| ( | )
| | | |
ARD N ARD N N
N M
d
d M 
 , 
which, unless ( | ) 0ARD N N  , is positive, implying that in this Constellation, the well-
being of the natives increases with the number of the assimilating migrants. 
2.3 Constellation III: Complete assimilation 
We now assume that the extent of the migrants’ assimilation is such that they replicate 
the incomes of the natives; that is, for any y N  there exists exactly one x M  such 
that y x ; hence, M N . In such a case, ) ( |( )|A ARDD N N NR M  and, thus, from 
Claim 1 we have that 
 ( | ) ( | ).ARD N N M ARD N N   
This result can also be obtained by drawing on Lemma 1 and equation (2). Indeed,  
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| | | |( | ) ( | ) ( | )
| | | |
| | 2 ( | ) ( | ).
2 | |
N MARD N N M ARD N N ARD N M
N M N M
N ARD N N ARD N N
N
  
  

  
Thus, complete assimilation does not change the aggregate relative deprivation of the 
natives. Consequently, their well-being remains unchanged.  
2.4 Constellation IV: Intensive assimilation 
Here we divide the population of the natives into two disjoint groups: 
: , }{ N y xN y x M      , and : , }{ N y xN y x M      , such that N N N   . 
That is, N  consists of natives whose incomes are lower than the incomes of all the 
assimilating migrants, and N  consists of natives whose incomes are the same as or 
higher than the incomes of all the assimilating migrants. In the following lemma we 
identify the minimal level of the mean income of migrants, 0x , for which in such a 
configuration of incomes, the aggregate relative deprivation of the natives increases after 
assimilation.  
Lemma 2. For subpopulations N  and N , we have that ( | )ARD N N M  
( | )ARD N N  if and only if 
 0
| | ( | ) | | ( | ) ,
| || |
N ARD N N N ARD N Nx y x
N N
     

    (3) 
where 1
| | x M
x x
M 
   and 1| | y Ny yN    are, respectively, the average income of the 
population of the migrants, and the average income of the population of the natives. 
Proof. Because ( | ) 0RD y M   for any y N , we have that 
 
1 1( | ) max{ ,0} ( )
| | | |
1 1 | | .
| | | |
z N x M z N x M
z N x M z N x M z N
ARD N M z z
M M
x x
x Nz x z
M M
 
  
   

    
   
   
   
    
 
In turn, using Lemma 1, Remark 1, and the fact that ( | ) 0ARD N N   , we have that 
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( | ) ( | )
( | ) ( | )
| | | |( | ) ( | )
| | | |
| | | |( | ) ( | )
| | | |
| | | | | |( | ) ( | ) ( | ).
| | | | | |
ARD N N ARD N N N N
ARD N N N ARD N N N
N NARD N N ARD N N
N N N N
N NARD N N ARD N N
N N N N
N N NARD N N ARD N N ARD N N
N N N
   
     
 
   
   
 
   
   
  
     

 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Expanding the middle term in the last line, we get 
 
 
| | 1 1( | ) max{ ,0} ( )
| | | | | |
1 1| | | | | |
| | | |
1 1| | | | | || | | |
| | | |
z N y N z N y N
z N y N y N z N
y N z N y N z N z N
y y
y y
y
N ARD N N z z
N N N
N z N N z
N N
N z N N zN N
N N
y z
   
   
    

 
   
  
   
 
    
   
            
               
   
   
    
| | | | ,
| | y N z N z N
N z N zy
N
y
 


  

     
 
and thus, we have that ( | ) ( | )ARD N M ARD N N  which, by Claim 1, is equivalent to 
( | ) ( | )ARD N N M ARD N N , if and only if 
 
 
( | ) ( | )
| | | | | || | ( | ) ( | ) ( | )
| | | | | |
| | | || | ( | ) | | ( | )
| | | |
1| | ( ) 0.| | ( | ) | | ( | )
| |
z N
z N z N
ARD N M ARD N N
N N Nx z ARD N N ARD N N ARD N N
N N N
N Nx z ARD N N N y z ARD N N
N N
x y N ARD N N N AR NN N
N
N
D
N

 
  
      

 
     
 
      

    
     
   

   
The inequality in the last line is equivalent to (3). □ 
The critical value of the mean income of migrants, 0x , which leads to an increase 
of the natives’ ARD is higher (meaning that it is becoming more difficult for migrants to 
lower the well-being of the natives - in terms of raising the natives’ ARD - as causing that 
requires the migrants to attain a higher average income) (I) the higher the average income 
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of the natives, and (II) the higher the magnitudes of the ARD of the constituent 
subpopulations of the natives. Whereas (I) seems to be quite obvious, Lemma 2 reveals 
an interesting relationship with respect to (II). Clearly, a high dispersion in incomes in 
any of the two subpopulations of the natives results in a high value of 0x . Thus, the 
higher the ARD experienced by the natives in any of their two subpopulations, the less 
likely it is that the assimilation of the migrants will lower the well-being of the natives. 
Moreover, Lemma 2 indicates that the ratio of the sizes of the two subpopulations of the 
natives determines which ARD - that of the richer subpopulation or that of the poorer 
subpopulation - influences 0x  more strongly. When the number of natives who earn more 
than the migrants is higher than the number of natives who earn less than the migrants 
( | | | |N N  ), then the ARD among the richer natives plays a bigger role in determining 
0x ; that is, a higher weight is assigned to the ARD of the richer natives in comparison 
with the weight assigned to the poorer natives. 
Revisiting the example of the incomes of Constellation IV in the Introduction, we 
have {3,5}N  , {3}N  , {5}N  , and {4.5,4.5}M  . Thus, the aggregate relative 
deprivation of the natives calculated with respect to their own population as a reference 
group, is 
 1( | ) ( | ) (5 3) 1
2y N
ARD N N RD y N

     , 
and the aggregate relative deprivation of the natives, calculated with respect to the 
migrants as a reference group, is 
  1 3( | ) ( | ) (4.5 3) (4.5 3)
2 2y N
ARD N M RD y M

     . 
Thus, 
 ( | ) ( | )ARD N M ARD N N ,  
and, indeed, the aggregate relative deprivation of the natives increases after the inclusion 
of the migrants in the reference group of the natives, namely, 
 14 
 
 
 1( | ) ( | ) (5 3) (4.5 3) (4.5 3)
4
5 1 ( | ).
4
y N
ARD N N M RD y N M
ARD N N

      
  
 
 
We also verify that (3) is satisfied: 
 
   01 1 1 0 1 04.5 4.5 4.5 4 3 52 2 2 1
| | ( | ) | | ( | ) .
| || |
x x
N ARD N N N ARD N Ny
N N
     

          
 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
Inspired by the findings of Akay et al. (2014), we formulated a simple theory that enables 
us to predict the impact of the assimilation of migrants on the well-being of the native 
inhabitants. Founded on the concept of relative deprivation, the theory tracks how the 
inclusion of migrants in the comparison group of the natives affects the well-being of the 
natives. We find that the crucial determinant in this regard is the relationship between the 
relative deprivation experienced by the natives from comparisons with other natives, and 
the relative deprivation experienced by the natives from comparisons with the 
assimilating migrants. 
In this paper, the decisions of the migrants as to how much effort they should put 
into assimilating, and what influences these decisions are not modeled. Here, as in Akay 
et al., our interest has been in assessing how different levels of assimilation interact with 
the natives’ sense of well-being. Examples of studies that model the migrants’ optimal 
assimilation effort are Fan and Stark (2007), Stark and Dorn (2013), and Stark and 
Jakubek (2013). 
Our purpose in this paper has been to assess the impact of alternative intensities of 
assimilation on the well-being of the natives, and to this end we have sought to lay out all 
feasible intensity categories. By construction, this is a comparative statics approach. We 
did not inquire how the natives will react when subjected to alternative assimilation 
intensities. For example, it could be the case that natives who are becoming more 
 15 
 
relatively deprived will choose to increase their work effort, obtain higher earnings, and 
thereby contain the increase in their relative deprivation. Similarly, in the spirit of Sorger 
and Stark (2013), natives who experience reduced relative deprivation as a consequence 
of assimilation may choose to reduce their work effort and earnings, retaining though 
their pre-assimilation level of overall well-being. Dynamics of this type could be an 
intriguing topic of follow-up research. 
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